Russian Ladoga 2013 Exercises: Target Finland

Russian military exercises in the Republic of Karelia near the Finnish border are due to start next week. Since the Georgia conflict in 2008, relations between Finland and Russia have deteriorated, particularly over the issue of possible Finnish membership of NATO. In the immediate aftermath of the South Ossetian War, Finnish defence officials noted Russia's use of camouflage patterns which were strikingly similar to those fielded by Finnish forces. As a result, military spokesman, Captain Karhuvaara stated that 'If Russian Minstry of the Interior Troops were to invade Finland, we would encounter serious trouble'. More generally, the recognition that Russia's threshold for using military violence was lower than anticipated has led to greater defence cooperation with other western states. It will be instructive to see how this year's drills compare with the Zapad and Ladoga 2009 exercises which were largest ever Russian exercises since the defeat of the Soviet Union in the Cold War. The latter were formally separate but may be considered as part of an extended series of exercises which took place in August and September 2009. Zapad 2009 featured a simulated tactical nuclear strike against Poland and thereby heralded the emergence of a military doctrine which legitimises the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons in a regional conflict against a non-nuclear power. This year, Finland may receive more of Russia's attention. According to the Russian Federation, NATO expansion to the Russo-Finnish frontier would by itself constitute a military threat. This point was made most bluntly by General Makarov last year when he compared Finnish behaviour to the situation in the Caucasus before 8 August 2008; that is to say, casus belli. This point is made explicit in article 17 of the 2009 Russian National Security Strategy which reads: 'The defining factor in relations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation will remain the unacceptability for Russia of plans to bring the Alliance’s military infrastructure forward to Russia’s borders'.[1] In accordance with Russia's military doctrine, this would necessarily lead to a military response. However, by wielding threats toward Finland, Russia may be encouraging the opposite outcome of that which it desires.

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[1] National Security Council, 'Strategiya natsional’noy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii do 2020 goda'

Sweden looks to counter-balance Russian rearmament

Recent revelations by the Swedish Armed Forces Chief, General Sverker Göranson, that his country could only effectively resist an attack by the Russian Federation for a few days have caused considerable consternation. According to assessments, in such a scenario, Sweden would rapidly require the military assistance of the US and NATO. His comments came as a protest against recent cuts to the Swedish military which have been enacted in spite of Russia’s marked increase in arms spending. Echoing the sentiments expressed by General Göranson, Deputy Prime Minister Jan Björklund stated that Sweden ought to consider, among other purchases, the procurement of Patriot missile batteries. Demonstrating that it was not only current and former military officers like Björklund who were of such an option, Foreign Minister Carl Bildt also chimed in with similar comments. He made it clear that Russian rearmament was 'worrying' and, although the likelihood of aggression was low, 'in an up-heated mode, Sweden, and Swedish territory could be affected'. The Russian Federation is indeed rearming. Defence spending in 2013 alone is set to increase by more than 25%. Sweden's defence spending per capita is only half of the Norwegian level and is clearly inadequate to deal with the potential threat posed by the Russian Federation.

These statements came only shortly after provocative comments made by Russian Defence Minister, Sergei Shoigu. In a speech to the Russian Academy for Military Sciences, Shoigu was blunt in describing the military threats facing Russia. He stated that its armed forces needed to be ready for 'large-scale conflict'. Particularly striking were his comments that 'the use of power continues to play an important role in the resolution of economic and political contradictions between countries'. Shoigu was perhaps referring to the use of force by his own country. Göranson used the example of the Georgian War to demonstrate that the use of armed violence can still result in territorial changes in Europe. The South Ossetian Conflict convinced the Nordic states that Russia's threshold for violence was lower than previously thought. The link between the Nordic States and the Five Day War in the Caucasus has not only been made by Scandinavian leaders, but is also one put forward by the Russians themselves. In June 2012, Russian General Chief of Staff Nikolai Makarov effectively threatened Finland. He noted its increasing cooperation with NATO and stated that, in light of the military manoeuvres in Eastern Finland at the time, the situation was comparable that which existed before the outbreak of hostilities in Georgia in 2008. There is now a strong and growing desire among many in the political and military establishment in Sweden to join NATO. Russian leaders often balk at the prospect of NATO expansion, but by wielding threats of armed force, they seem to do everything in their power to bring it about.